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Abstract. This study explores the relationship between principles of distributive justice (DJ)
and the durability of negotiated agreements. Sixteen peace agreements negotiated during the
early 1990s were coded for the centrality of each of four principles of DJ – equality,
proportionality, compensation, and need – to the core terms of the agreement. The agreements
were also assessed on scales of implementation and durability over a five-year period. Another
variable included in the analysis was the difficulty of the conflict environment. These data were
used to evaluate three sets of hypotheses: the relationship between DJ and durability, the role
of the conflict environment, and types of DJ principles. The results obtained from both
statistical and focused-comparison analyses indicate that DJ moderates the relationship
between conflict environments and outcomes: when principles of justice are central to an
agreement, the negative effects of difficult conflict environments are reduced; when principles
are not central, the negative effects of difficulty are heightened. These relationships are
accounted for primarily by one of the four DJ principles – equality. Implications of these
findings are discussed along with a number of ideas for further research.
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Introduction
Restoring order and stability is the key objective of negotiations to end civil wars.
This goal is a distinguishing feature of such talks, referred to also as normalisation
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negotiations.1 Issues of justice are at the heart of these negotiations. They may be
part of the problem or part of the solution. Unresolved issues of justice perpetuate
the conflict and contribute to impasses in negotiation. Resolved issues ameliorate
the conflict and contribute to improved relationships. A substantial literature has
examined the influence of justice principles on the processes of interpersonal,2
organisational,3 and international4 negotiation. A much smaller number of studies
have focused on the role of justice in the implementation of negotiated agreements.
The analyses reported in this article address this gap in the literature. They
evaluate the relationship between principles of justice and the durability of
agreements intended to bring peace to warring parties within nations.
Durability is more likely to be achieved when the sources of conflict are
addressed and resolved. Issues of justice are often salient sources of civil wars.
Examples of justice issues include amnesty for crimes, prisoner release and
reintegration, compensation, military and police reform, and the establishment of
human rights commissions. They reflect such principles as restorative (amnesty,
reforms), retributive (trials, sanctions), structural (participation, power relations,
issue ordering), procedural (vetting, commissions), and distributive (compensation,
distribution of positions among groups) justice. These principles can be dis-
tinguished as being forward-looking (structural, distributive) and backward-
looking (restorative, retributive).5 The former provide a foundation for a new order
based on the rule of law. The latter address the grievances that restore
relationships. To the extent that all the parties (former combatants) adhere to the
relevant principles, they contribute to the durability of the agreed terms. However,
if the principles serve as mere ‘window dressing’ intended to stop the fighting in the
short-term or serve political side effects, they jeopardise the life of the agreements.
Distributive justice
The focus of this study is specifically on the type of justice referred to as
distributive. Distributive Justice (DJ) consists of general standards for allocating
collective benefits or burdens among the members of a group or community. They
are principles of outcome justice as distinct from justice of the process and
procedures from which outcomes result. How process and procedural justice relate
to distributive justice is much debated in concept and practice6 but the distinctions
among the different types of justice remain well established. We have chosen to
1 Fred C. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).
2 Morton Deutsch, ‘Equity, Equality and Need: What Determines Which Value Will Be Used as the
Basis of Distributive Justice?’, Journal of Social Issues, 31:3 (1975), pp. 137–50.
3 Mary A. Konovsky, ‘Understanding Procedural Justice and Its Impact on Business Organizations’,
Journal of Management, 26:3 (2000), pp. 489–511.
4 Cecilia Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001); Cecilia Albin, ‘The Role of Fairness in Negotiation’, Negotiation Journal, 9:3 (1993),
pp. 223–44; I. William Zartman and Victor A. Kremenyuk (eds), Peace versus Justice: Negotiating
Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes (Lanham,Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
5 Zartman and Kremenyuk, Peace versus Justice.
6 Konovsky, ‘Understanding Procedural Justice and Its Impact on Business Organizations’; R.
Buchanan, ‘Perpetual Peace or Perpetual Process: Global Civil Society and Cosmopolitan Legality
at the World Trade Organization’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 16 (2003), pp. 673–99.
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examine four DJ principles in agreements: equality, proportionality, compensation,
and need. Although these principles may assume many meanings, we provide
precise definitions applicable to the context of peace agreements.
There are several reasons for focusing attention on DJ. One is that the content
of agreements deals mostly with the allocation of gains and burdens. These are
matters of distributive justice. Another is that the four DJ principles are well
recognised and established in both research and policy-oriented literatures. Given
the purpose of this study, it was important to select principles which are widely
seen as capturing essential aspects of justice. A third reason is that these principles
are suited to the study’s methodological requirements. They are defined external to
particular parties and situations, and, thus, facilitate the development of reliable
indicators. They do not require capturing the parties’ perceptions. In other words,
tracking these principles in agreements does not depend on information about the
parties’ own views. Nor does it depend on the manner in which the agreement was
negotiated. Other principles of justice, such as ‘impartiality’7 and a ‘balanced
settlement of conflicting claims’,8 are more likely to rely on such information.
Durability of agreements
Research on the conditions and requirements for durable peace – usually defined
as the absence of organised violence – has expanded in recent years.9 Yet there are
few clearly stated or reasonably comprehensive definitions of what constitutes a
durable agreement. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) in Sweden
defines a peace agreement as durable ‘as long as it is implemented’. Furthermore,
such an agreement ‘[. . .] has failed the date when one of the parties states that
the agreement is annulled, or if violence clearly shows that one or both parties
have left the agreement.’10 Progress has been made in defining various degrees of
success in implementing peace agreements, although there is some contention about
the meaning of success with both optimistic or ‘liberal’11 and pessimistic or
‘conservative’12 views being expressed.
7 Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation.
8 Our decision to take this approach is not meant to preclude the importance of perceptions in justice
decisions. Indeed, useful research on justice has been reported from a psychological perspective. (See
G. Mikula and M. Wenzel, ‘Justice and Social Conflicts’, International Journal of Psychology, 35:2
(2000), pp. 126–35; and Morton Deutsch, Distributive Justice: A Social-Psychological Perspective
(New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1985). However, the focus of this study on past peace
agreements does limit the extent to which perceptions and opinions can be assessed. Simply put, the
actors are not available for interviews and few provide first-person documentation of their
experiences. Thus, our analyses reveal general patterns that would be further amplified by data on
perceptions.
9 V. Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004); D. Nilsson, ‘In the Shadow of Settlement: Multiple Rebel Groups
and Precarious Peace’, Doctoral dissertation, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden (2006).
10 {http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/definitions_all.htm}.
11 Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The
Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2002).
12 Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004).
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Two aspects of durability include:
Duration of the agreement over time: This refers to the number of years it remains
in force legally and/or effectively. An agreement may endure legally and effectively
even if violations by some parties take place. In fact, this is quite a common
phenomenon. On the legal side, however, some agreements do specify under what
conditions they will no longer be in force.
Implementation of and adherence to the agreement by parties: This definition
captures the parties’ behaviour with regard to their adherence to the agreement.
This concerns the steps and measures taken to carry out the commitments made
either by primary or third parties. It also concerns honouring and living by the
terms of the agreement over the longer term.
Drawing on these two aspects, an agreement is durable as long as it is
reasonably effective in serving its stated goals. This usually means that there are
few (if any) violations, or that violations have at least not undermined the central
objectives of the agreement. There may be breaches and other problems, but the
agreement is durable to the extent that it manages to do what was intended by the
signatories.
DJ and durability: an example
Relationships between DJ and durability have rarely been explored in the context of
peace agreements, except perhaps those that deal specifically with power sharing
arrangements. By contrast, well-known and well-researched cases from the global and
regional environment illustrate well how DJ can influence the durability of agreements.
The l987 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete The Ozone Layer is
one such case. The core terms of this agreement were based on three principles of
distributive justice. These principles take account of the varied conditions and
concerns of signatory states. The proportionality principle drove the Protocol’s call
for reductions in chlorofluorocarbon emissions proportional to each country’s 1986
level beginning in 1993, thus imposing a greater (unequal) cost of regulation on
industrialised countries. Compensatory justice informs the provision for financial
and technical assistance to the South, and their exemption from the stipulated
emission reductions for the first ten years for purposes of economic development.
The equality norm was expressed in the long-term goal of the North and the South
sharing regulation costs on a basis of parity.13 Now into its twenty-second year, the
Montreal Protocol has been widely adopted and implemented and is frequently
cited as an exceptionally successful example of international cooperation. Another
illustration of the relationship between DJ and durability comes from the
European acid rain negotiations – the 1994 Oslo Protocol on Further Reductions
of Sulfur Emissions.14 That case is described briefly below.
In this study, we investigate in some detail the role played by DJ in the
durability of peace agreements. That role is evaluated in the context of both
13 Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation, p. 38.
14 Ibid., pp. 81–96.
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relatively high and low conflict environments. Relationships among these variables
are specified in a set of hypotheses that is evaluated with 16 peace agreements
mostly negotiated just after the end of the Cold War. Peace negotiations are
distinct in a number of respects. They typically involve two or a small number of
parties characterised by power asymmetries, unlike large-scale multilateral nego-
tiations over global issues such as trade and the environment. They address
deep-rooted conflicts which are mostly internal or intra-national, and often in the
shadow of violence. Identity issues are salient and security concerns are empha-
sised. Both statistical and focused comparison methods are used in the analyses.
The results bear on the hypotheses and suggest ideas for further research.
In the sections to follow we: a) present the set of hypotheses; b) describe the
coding procedures and report reliabilities; c) present the case data set; d) discuss
how the data are analysed; e) report the statistical and focused comparison
results, and f) develop implications for the hypotheses, including next steps in the
research.
Hypotheses
In this section, we discuss sources for a set of ten hypotheses organised into three
parts: the relationship between DJ and durability, the conflict environment, and
types of distributive justice principles. An attempt is made to present competing
hypotheses with regard to the relationship between justice and durability as well as
the role played by each of four justice principles.
Distributive justice and durability
Recent writing has provided bases for alternative hypotheses about the justice-
durability relationship. On the positive side, Rothchild argued that proportionate
representation increases the chances of implementing peace agreements.15 With
regard to human rights, Bell claimed that agreements last longer when human
rights stipulations are included in the texts.16 Zartman and Kremenyuk’s distinc-
tion between forward and backward-looking outcomes is also relevant.17 Forward-
looking outcomes, emphasising improved future relationships, are thought to lead
to more durable agreements than backward-looking outcomes concerned with
settling past grievances and reparations. These arguments are based on the idea
that justice (or fairness) promotes trust which results in more stable relationships.18
Moreover, peace agreements based on principles of distributive justice frequently
stipulate some form of power-sharing which, in turn, has been found to increase
15 Donald Rothchild, ‘Settlement terms and postagreement stability’, in Stephen Stedman, Donald
Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements
(Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
16 C. Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
17 Zartman and Kremenyuk, Peace versus Justice.
18 See, for example, Mary A. Konovsky and S. D. Pugh, ‘Citizenship Behavior and Social Exchange’,
Academy of Management Journal, 37 (1994), pp. 656–69.
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durability,19 particularly with regard to military and territorial issues.20 To the
extent that principles of distributive justice are included in peace agreements, the
chances for durable agreements are thus improved. This positive view can be stated
as a hypothesis:
1. The inclusion of DJ principles in an agreement leads to more durable
agreements.
An opposing view about the justice-durability relationship has been offered
by Snyder and Vinjamuri, Putnam, Bazerman and Neale, and Zartman and
Kremenyuk.21 Snyder and Vinjamuri claimed that durability may be undermined
by including considerations of justice in the terms of the agreement. They suggest
that justice considerations be entertained only after politically-expedient bargains
that insure peace have been struck. In their words, ‘Once such deals are struck,
institutions based on the rule of law become more feasible.”22 Putnam argued that
durability is not influenced by raising normative considerations during the
bargaining process. She went on to say that the absence of provisions for justice,
such as human rights, in a peace agreement does not inhibit their inclusion or role
in subsequent laws. These arguments are based on the idea that principles of justice
stir controversy about the ‘correct’ principle and its implementation, as well as
being detrimental to peace-building. Like other principles and values, justice may
evoke strong commitments that threaten the negotiation process. This was
demonstrated in a series of experiments23 and in a case study.24 Such commitments
evoked by justice may also jeopardise the durability of the agreement, and may
thwart attempts to improve relationships and stabilise the political order.25
They may also lead to sub-optimal outcomes that do not last, as noted by
Bazerman and Neale. These authors claimed that ‘fairness considerations can lead
negotiators to opt for joint outcomes that leave both parties worse off than they
would have been had fairness considerations been ignored.’26 To the extent that the
19 C. Hartzell and M. Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement
of Civil Wars (University Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007); C. Hartzell and M.
Hoddie, ‘Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post Civil War Conflict Management’,
American Journal of Political Science, 47 (2003), pp. 318–32.
20 A. Jarstad and R. Sundberg, ‘Peace by pact: Data on the implementation of peace agreements’, in
A. Swain, A. Ramses and J. Ojendal (eds), Globalization and Challenges to Building Peace (London:
Anthem Press, 2007).
21 Jack Snyder and L. Vinjamuri, ‘Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of
International Justice’, International Security, 28 (2003/4), pp. 5–44; T. Putnam, ‘Human rights and
sustainable peace’, in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens (eds), Ending Civil
Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2002); Max Bazerman and Margaret Neale, ‘The role of fairness considerations and
relationships in a judgment perspective of negotiations’, in Kenneth Arrow, Robert Mnookin, Lee
Ross, Amos Tversky and R. Wilson (eds), Barriers to Conflict Resolution (New York: W. W. Norton,
1995); Zartman and Kremenyuk, Peace versus Justice.
22 Snyder and Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors, p. 2.
23 For example, see Daniel Druckman, Benjamin Broome and Susan Korper, ‘Value Differences
and Conflict Resolution: Facilitation or Delinking?’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32 (1988),
pp. 489–510.
24 Daniel Druckman and Justin Green, ‘Playing two games: Internal negotiations in the Philippines’,
in I. William Zartman (ed.), Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington DC.:
Brookings, 1995).
25 Druckman and Green, ‘Playing two games’.
26 Bazerman and Neale, ‘The role of fairness considerations’, p. 89.
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negotiating parties view a fair outcome as being sub-optimal, the agreement is less
likely to endure. And, the ‘fair’ outcome is more likely to be viewed this way if
the justice principles focus primarily on past injustices rather than on future
relationships.27
Another source for this view is the distinction between authentic and tactical
justice. The latter is motivated by a need to appear just for reasons unrelated to
fairness.28 It is a method of persuasion used to promote an agreement that serves
the tactician’s interests or to manage a conflict that has become costly: Its
effectiveness turns on perceptions of the tactician’s authenticity. These tactics are
more likely to be employed when there is a tension between self and communal
interests. The self-interested negotiator is tempted to tamper with the process by
offering concessions or espousing ‘win-win’ solutions in order to give the
appearance of fairness. This negotiator is masking self-interest behind a veil of
apparent joint interest. The communal negotiator is more likely to entertain
proposals for revealing underlying interests and needs in a problem-solving format.
This negotiator is conveying the importance of fairness during the process. At stake
are the consequences of the final agreement for future relationships between the
disputing parties. Thus, when justice is used for tactical reasons, to secure an
agreement beneficial to one party, the agreement is likely to be less durable.
This then suggests a second hypothesis:
2. The inclusion of DJ principles in an agreement leads to less durable agreements.
The conflict environment
The negative effect of distributive justice principles, suggested by the second
hypothesis, is more likely to occur when there are low levels of trust between the
parties. Trust is relatively low in highly intense conflicts. Low (high) trust leads to
less (more) cooperative negotiations, increasing (reducing) the perceived intensity of
the conflict.29 Thus, the conflict environment may influence the impact of justice on
the durability of an agreement. Analyses performed by Downs and Stedman showed
that some conflict environments are more conducive to the implementation of peace
agreements than others. They found that four variables were strongly related to
implementation success: the existence of a spoiler, the presence of disposable
resources, the presence of a neighbouring state that is hostile to the agreement,
and the involvement of major powers in the conflict. The more the first three
indicators are present, the greater the difficulty in implementing the agreement:
Implementation was easier when a major power showed interest in the conflict.30
27 Zartman and Kremenyuk, Peace versus Justice.
28 Gerald S. Leventhal, J. Karuza and W. R. Fry, ‘Beyond fairness: A theory of allocation preferences’,
in G. Mikula (ed.), Justice and Social Interaction (New York: Springer Verlag. 1980).
29 Roy J. Lewicki, J. A. Litterer, J. W. Minton and D. M. Sanders, Negotiation (2nd Edition) (Burr
Ridge IL.: Irwin, 1994).
30 George Downs and Stephen J. Stedman, ‘Evaluation issues in peace implementation’, in Stephen
Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of
Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
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Aspects of the environment such as those measured by Downs and Stedman
may be regarded as features or actions that fuel the conflict – for example, the
number of soldiers, hostile neighbouring states, and wars of secession. They are
symptoms of the underlying issues. Addressing these issues in negotiation can lead
to a peace that enables the parties to discuss the root causes, including concerns
about injustice. This occurred in the forward-looking Mozambique negotiations. It
did not occur in the backward-looking negotiations over Nagorno Karabakh
(N-K).31 The negotiations on Mozambique took place as the conflict was winding
down; the conflict environment was moderately difficult. The negotiations over
N-K were convened in the context of a brutal offensive that claimed more than
10,000 lives; negotiators on both sides were motivated to cut their battle costs.32
The conflict environment was very difficult. Although both agreements have been
durable, the former (Mozambique) has led to progress on resolving the underlying
issues of conflict whereas the latter (N-K) has not dealt with these issues. As we
will show, distributive justice issues were included in the Mozambique agreement.
They were largely absent in the 1994 cease-fire agreement on N-K. These cases
provide examples of the way that the environment and justice principles interact in
influencing durability.
The interaction question has not been addressed by previous analyses on civil
wars. Do the principles serve to increase trust and stabilise relationships as
suggested by the ‘positive’ arguments above? Or, do they further decrease trust and
de-stabilise relationships as suggested by the ‘negative’ claims discussed above?33 A
possible way of bridging the competing claims is to consider justice in the context
of conflict environments. These considerations suggest that the impact of distribu-
tive justice on the durability of agreements is contingent on the conflict
environment. This relationship is summarised by two hypotheses:
3. The inclusion of DJ principles in peace agreements will result in less durable
agreements when the conflict is more intense.
4. The inclusion of DJ principles in peace agreements will result in more durable
agreements when the conflict is less intense.
We examine a relatively large set of peace agreements. Because we are
concerned with the relationship between negotiated outcomes and the durability of
agreements, we have chosen to focus on principles of distributive justice. We are
particularly interested in learning about how durability is influenced by the
interaction between these principles and the environments within which they are
negotiated. In the next section, we discuss distinctions among various DJ principles
and offer a third set of hypotheses.
31 Daniel Druckman and Terrence Lyons, ‘Negotiation processes and post-settlement relations:
Comparing Nagorno-Karabakh with Mozambique’, in I. William Zartman and Victor A.
Kremenyuk (eds), Peace vs. Justice: Forward and Backward Looking Outcomes in Negotiation
(Lanham MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
32 Moorad Mooradian and Daniel Druckman, ‘Hurting Stalemate or Mediation? The Conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990–1995’, Journal of Peace Research, 36 (1999), pp. 709–27.
33 Trust is regarded as a variable or construct that intervenes between the conflict environment and the
durability of agreements. As noted in fn. 8 above, measurements of perceptions are beyond the scope
of this study. Thus, it is not included in the above hypotheses.
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Types of DJ principles
Each of the four types of DJ principles may be favoured under particular
circumstances. The equality principle may be sought in complex negotiations where
the parties are roughly equal in power.34 It is a salient decision rule or focal point
that encourages coordination.35 In addition, this principle may be preferred when
the negotiation is about changing the political order or establishing new collabo-
rations as a means to promote improved relationships for the future. Such
forward-looking discussions often address key sources of conflict in internal
conflicts or civil wars.
Support for the importance of the equality principle comes from laboratory
studies. Deutsch found that equality, rather than proportionality or need, was the
dominant principle used by experimental subjects in distributing resources.36
Although the experimental situations differ in many ways from the circumstances
of peace negotiations, they share certain dimensions. These are both relational
and cognitive: interdependence between the disputing parties, an aspiration for
cooperation or solidarity, and uncertainty about the relative advantages to be
gained from an agreement or about the future.37 Many of the cases analysed in this
study contain these features. Equality may be judged as reinforcing the idea that
we are in this together. It may also be regarded as the less risky basis for decisions.
Thus, equality may be expected to be the key DJ principle in agreements. Further,
equality (rather than other DJ principles) leads to more durable agreements.
Another source for the role of equality comes from Uslaner’s idea of an
inequality trap.38 Focusing primarily on corruption, he argues that inequality,
mistrust and corruption are mutually reinforcing. His data show that inequality
correlates with high ingroup but low outgroup trust. Peace negotiations are
between distrusting antagonists. They need to repair the distrust in order to reach
agreements. This may be accomplished by including equality principles in the
agreement. According to Uslaner’s model, these principles will, in turn, enhance
trust and reduce the likelihood of corruption or instability. These correlated
variables combine to strengthen the durability of the agreement.
Two hypotheses are suggested by these arguments:
5. The equality principle occurs more frequently than other DJ principles in peace
agreements.
6. More durable agreements occur when the principle of equality is emphasised in
the agreements.
Proportionality may be preferred when there are relevant and recognised
differences between the parties which can be assessed in agreed ways; for example,
representation in terms of the size of sectarian groups. This principle also addresses
a source of conflict by recognising relevant inequalities when present and
34 See Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation.
35 Thomas C. Schelling, ‘Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War’, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 1 (1957), pp. 19–36.
36 Morton Deutsch, ‘Equity, Equality and Need: What Determines which Value will Be Used as the
Basis of Distributive Justice?’, Journal of Social Issues, 31 (1975), pp. 137–50.
37 See also John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness’, Philosophical Review, 67 (1958), pp. 164–94.
38 Eric Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008).
Distributive justice and peace agreements 1145
distributing resources or burdens accordingly.39 It has been promoted as a primary
principle for addressing conflicts between asymmetrical parties, including through
power-sharing. For example, in a post-settlement period, sharing of governmental
powers based on proportionality can protect minority interests without endanger-
ing the majority group’s leadership. It can help still fears of domination, and give
minority groups incentives to collaborate with the regime.40 Such proportionality
considerations may also promote equality over time.
These arguments suggest two hypotheses:
7. The proportionality principle occurs more frequently than other DJ principles
in peace agreements.
8. More durable agreements occur when the principle of proportionality is
emphasised in the agreements.
Compensation and needs principles are likely to be emphasised under other
circumstances. Compensation occurs when parties seek to rectify damages or costs
that have been incurred during the conflict or in the past. This principle is
backward looking in the sense that it addresses past injustices.41 Needs refer to
essential living conditions and related wants that have been neglected during the
course of a conflict. Many needs are survival relevant, including proper housing,
food, and sanitation. Addressing them in negotiation may also be an attempt to
rectify past injustices.42 Thus, like compensation, needs principles may surface in
agreements that deal primarily with the symptoms of conflict. Whatever the case,
adherence to the needs principle may improve the living conditions for a
discriminated group but does not change the inequalities which are often
responsible for the perpetuation of the conflict.
These considerations have implications for durability. Conflicts are more likely
to persist when only their symptoms are addressed. These are referred to as
backward-looking negotiations.43 Although violence may be reduced or eliminated,
the issues that gave rise to the dispute remain. For this reason, there is a reasonable
likelihood that violence can re-occur. An example is the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabahk discussed above. The conflict is less likely to re-ignite when the sources
have been resolved, as in the case of Mozambique.44 Thus, negotiated agreements
that deal with the sources of conflict – such as issues of inequality and/or
proportionality – are likely to be more durable than those that address symptoms,
such as compensation for past discrimination The former are referred to as
forward-looking negotiations.45 The needs principle serves basic wants, typically
for the weaker party whose life conditions have suffered and deteriorated during
39 Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation.
40 Donald Rothchild, ‘Settlement terms and postagreement stability’, in Stephen Stedman, Donald
Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements
(Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
41 Zartman and Kremenyuk, Peace versus Justice.
42 Jay Rothman, Resolving Identity-based Conflict in Nations, Organizations, and Communities (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997); Jay Rothman, ‘Negotiation as Consolidation: Prenegotiation in the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 13 (1991), pp. 22–44.
43 I. William Zartman, ‘Negotiating forward and backward-looking outcomes’, in I. William Zartman
and Victor A. Kremenyuk (eds), Peace versus Justice. Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking
Outcomes (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
44 Druckman and Lyons, ‘Negotiation processes and post-settlement relations’.
45 Zartman, ‘Negotiating forward and backward-looking outcomes’.
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the course of conflict. It is essentially backward-looking, particularly when
addressing conflict symptoms in this sense. However, by helping to bring
disadvantaged parties up to a basic level of well-being, this principle may also
contribute to lessening inequalities in the society.
These considerations can be summarised in the form of an hypothesis:
9. Less durable agreements occur when the principles of compensation and/or
need are emphasised in the agreements.
A final hypothesis summarises the relationship between the two forward-
looking and backward-looking principles and durability:
10. More durable agreements occur when forward-looking (equality and propor-
tionality) – rather than backward-looking (compensation and need) – principles
are emphasised in the agreements.
This set of hypotheses is evaluated in this study following discussions of how
the variables were coded (including reliabilities) and analysis methods.
Coding distributive justice
The project developed two documents to be used by coders when evaluating the
presence and importance of distributive justice in specific peace agreements.
The first was a guide for analysing and coding negotiated agreements. For each of
the four principles examined – equality, proportionality, compensation, and
need – the guide shown in Figure 1 provides a definition, key indicators and
examples of application. Its purpose is to help coders recognise and identify the
principles in the texts of agreements. These principles are not always mentioned by
name. However, even when they are not mentioned, they may still be present and
at work in an agreement. Coders were instructed to judge the presence of each of
the four principles. A principle is regarded as being present when it is clearly,
beyond reasonable doubt, underlying at least one provision in the agreement, even
if not mentioned by name or referred to as a justice issue.
The second document consisted of a series of questions to be addressed for each
agreement. The first set of questions concerns identifying the presence of justice in
the agreement: Are any of the principles – equality, proportionality, compensation,
or need – reflected in the terms of the agreement, either explicitly by name or, if
implicitly, clearly present beyond reasonable doubt? For each of the four principles
found in the agreement: In what part(s) of the agreement is the principle found?
Is it explicitly stated, or implicit (beyond reasonable doubt)? Is the principle strictly
applied (the agreement reflects a model/‘exact’ application of the principle), or does
it rather guide or influence the agreement’s provisions?
The second set of questions asks the coder to assess the importance of justice in
the agreement. Importance is measured in two ways. The first is by the number of
principles reflected in an agreement. This is based on the notion that a greater
number of principles generally reflect a wider range of considerations that are
important to take into account in order to establish justice in actual situations.46
46 Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation.
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Figure 1. A guide for coding negotiated agreements.
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The second is by the extent to which a principle informs or directs an agreement’s
core terms. The 1994 Oslo Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulfur Emissions (acid
rain) in Europe provides an illustrative example: The principles of proportionality
and compensatory justice greatly influenced the core terms for distributing emission
cuts and the associated costs. The equality principle underlies the provision for an
equal number of seats for each party on a conciliation commission. This was a less
central provision given the substance and main objective of the Protocol.
For each justice principle included in the agreement the coder is asked to
evaluate how significant it is for its core terms, expressed as a score on a scale from
0 to 2 as follows:
2: Highly significant (at heart of agreement and its core provisions; without this
principle the agreement would be fundamentally different);
1.75:Between highly significant and important;
1.5: Important (included in some of the main terms of the agreement);
1.25:Between important and marginal;
1: Marginal (included, but for lesser – not core - issues in the agreement),
0: The principle is not mentioned or implied in the agreement.47
The score is an aggregate value across the four principles, and reflects the
overall significance of justice. That score ranges from 0 (no principle is significant)
to 8 (all four principles are highly significant for the agreement’s core provisions).
Coding reliability for distributive justice
Two coders, working independently, judged each of 16 agreements (discussed
below) on the extent to which each of the four principles was significant. Both
coders followed the guide shown in Figure 1 and made decisions on the significance
scale ranging from 0–2 for each principle. The scores ranged from 0–8 across the
four principles. Judgments made by each coder are shown by case in Table 1. The
differences are very small in practically all of the cases; the difference exceeded one
scale point only in the Angola 1 case. The correlation between their judgments,
across the cases, is .87 (p < .001). This is impressive evidence for agreement. We
conclude that the DJ codes are highly reliable.48
Coding durability
Two approaches were used for coding the durability of each agreement. One,
developed by Downs and Stedman, consists of a three-step scale of implementation
47 Equivalent distances between the steps from marginal to highly significant are based on the
assumption that increments in significance are matters of degree; in this scale the increments are .25.
The larger distance between the codes for marginally significant and no principles (1 scale step) is
based on the assumption that inclusion of any principles is qualitatively distinct from no inclusion.
48 In addition, ratings done by experts were compared to those provided by students in a graduate
programme on diplomacy. The cases were Cambodia and Bosnia. The same justice score of 5 was
assigned to Cambodia; the experts assigned a justice score of 5 while the students gave a score of
4 to Bosnia.
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success, including: failure (1); partial success (2), and success (3).49 This approach
was used for the correlational analyses.50 Another approach, devised by the
authors, consisted of two sets of questions. One set concerns duration over time;
that is, the number of years it has remained in force legally and in practice. We
limited our examination to the five-year period following the date when the
agreement entered into force rather than when it was signed, if different. For
the peace agreements analysed here, it was deemed to be a sufficient time span.51
The coder is asked whether the agreement is still in force in three respects: legally,
effectively (the agreement serves its goals reasonably well in practice), and in the
eyes of the parties (no party has stated or acted in such a way as to declare that
the agreement is annulled). An overall assessment is then made about whether the
agreement was still in force after five years. If not, the time span of the agreement
is specified as well as the manner in which it was annulled. If so, the number and
identity of those parties who had signed and ratified the agreement within two
months of its entry into force are specified.
Another set of questions asks whether and to what extent parties have
implemented and complied with the terms of the agreement, or violated it, dur-
ing the five-year period. Only those parties who had signed and ratified the
agreement within two months of its entry into force are included. Moreover, only
49 Downs and Stedman, Evaluation issues in peace implementation.
50 These codes were used in order to maintain consistency with the other variables coded by Downs
and Stedman and used in our correlational analyses. An independent check on the Downs-Stedman
implementation codes by the authors revealed disagreements in only two of the 16 cases. These
anomalies are discussed below.
51 Other types of agreements may require different time spans. For example, multilateral environmental
agreements often specify complex conditions for implementation – some provisions may take more
time to kick in than others. However, there is a trade off between the length of the implementation
period examined and the amount of information needed to track adherence by each of the parties.
Table 1. Cases by Distributive Justice Coding Decisions*
Case Coder 1 Coder 2
Angola I 1.33 2.75
Angola II 0 0
Bosnia 3 3.5
Cambodia 1.47 1.5
El Salvador 3.33 2.5
Guatemala 4 3.25
Lebanon 3.67 3
Liberia 1.33 1.25
Mozambique 4.33 4.5
Namibia 3.33 4.25
Nicaragua 4.33 3.5
Rwanda 3.67 4
Sierra Leone 3.33 3
Somalia 3 3.5
Sri Lanka 2.33 3
Zimbabwe 4.33 3.75
* Each agreement judged by independent coders. The scores are aggregates across the four principles,
each coded in terms of a scale that ranges from 0–2. The maximum score is 8.
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implementation and any violations of the terms of the original agreement are
considered, not later additions. The coder is asked to indicate which of the
following best describes the status of the agreement during the entire five-year
period.
1. The agreement has been fully implemented by all parties; no violations have
occurred.
2. There have been minor implementation breaches/violations. This is defined as
only a few violations of the agreement have occurred, and these violations have
not significantly affected the goals of the agreement.
3. There have been ‘medium’ implementation breaches/violations. This is defined
as some parties have violated the agreement, and these violations have
undermined some goals of it.
4. There have been serious implementation breaches/violations (without abroga-
tion). This is defined as several (or all) parties have violated the agreement, and
these violations undermine the goals of the agreement in significant ways.
Based on his or her answers to the two sets of questions, the coder is asked to
rate the overall durability of the agreement over the five-year period on the
following scale:
1. Perfect
2. Highly durable
3. Good
4. Some elements of durability
5. Very poor or non-existent
This approach was used in our focused comparison analyses discussed below.
Reliability was assessed with a small sample of cases from the peace agreements
data set: Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia. Judgments made by students
in a diplomacy programme at the Australian National University were compared
to those made by case experts and by Downs and Stedman.52 The students’ ratings
were similar to those provided by the experts and by Downs and Stedman. The
judgments on overall durability were as follows: Cambodia – 4 (students), 4
(experts), partial success by Downs and Stedman; Bosnia – 3.5 (students), 4
(experts), partial success by Downs and Stedman; Rwanda – 5 (students), failed
implementation by Downs and Stedman, and Somalia – 5 (students), failed
implementation by Downs and Stedman. These judgments are very close and in
several cases identical. They provide evidence for the reliability of the durability
scale.
Coding forward and backward-looking outcomes
The distinction between forward and backward-looking outcomes refers to whether
an agreement emphasised new relationships and institutions or dealt primarily with
52 The experts were Ramses Amer (Cambodia) and James Goodby (Bosnia). See Downs and Stedman,
‘Evaluation issues in peace implementation’.
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past injustices including reconciliation or apology, restitution, and retribution for
abuses. This idea was captured by a five-step scale that ranged from past (1) to
future-oriented (5) agreements. The decision to construct a five-step scale was
based on the judgment that most of the peace agreements were mixed in varying
degrees: Only a few of the agreements were pure cases of future orientation. The
mixed feature was captured by distinctions between more past than future oriented
(2), balanced between past and future oriented (3), and more future than past
oriented (4). An attempt was made to code all the cases on this variable
independent of judgments made on the justice principles. A second independent
coder used the scale with a random selection of eight cases to assess reliability. The
correlation between the eight pairs of ratings is .65 (p < .08 with 7 df). None of
the coding pairs differed by more than one scale step. Three of the cases
(Mozambique, Zimbabwe and El Salvador) were coded as ‘pure’ examples of
future orientation (5) by the first coder. They were coded as ‘4’ by the second
coder. We concluded that the scale is reliable. The first coder’s judgments were
used to evaluate hypothesis 10.
A peace agreements data set
Downs and Stedman provide a data set well suited for evaluating the justice
durability hypothesis. The sixteen peace agreements were negotiated during the
1980s and 1990s. The earliest was the 1980 agreement on Zimbabwe implemented
by the British; the most recent was the Sierra Leone agreement signed in 1996.
Fifteen of the 16 agreements where negotiated in the aftermath of the Cold War,
when internal conflicts were frequent. Thus, the findings apply primarily to this
period. However this set of cases also provides variety in terms of geographical
location, legacy of the conflicts, and types of disputing parties. Thus, the findings
may also be regarded as robust. In addition to the three-step scale on implemen-
tation success, Downs and Stedman coded difficulty of the conflict environment
and willingness of international actors to intervene. The complete data set, with the
Downs-Stedman and Druckman/Albin variables, is shown in Table 2.
The conflict environment
Eight indicators of difficulty or conflict intensity included the number of warring
parties (two or more), intervention in the absence of a peace agreement
(present/absent), likelihood of spoilers (likely/unlikely), a collapsed state (with or
without a governing capacity), number of soldiers (more or less than 50,000),
disposable natural resources (warring parties do or do not have access), the
presence of hostile neighbouring states (stable or unstable region), and wars of
secession (wars fought over national sovereignty or over other issues). The either/or
codes were summed for an index that varies between 0 (very low difficulty) and 8
(very high difficulty). This index is used to evaluate hypotheses 3 and 4 on conflict
intensity.
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Three indicators of interest and commitment by international actors included
regional power interest (statement made of a security interest in the conflict),
willingness of other states to provide financial resources for an intervention, and
willingness to take risks by committing soldiers to the conflict. The three
dichotomous codes were aggregated for an index that varied from 0 (low
willingness) to 3 (high willingness). Although not specified as a hypothesis, the
willingness variable is included in the analysis as another aspect of the conflict
environment that may influence durability. The difficulty and willingness scores are
shown for each case in Table 2. The implementation scores are also shown in the
table; they range from 1 (failure) to 3 (success).
Distributive justice
Each of the 16 agreements was also coded for principles of distributive justice
following the procedures discussed above. Complete texts of all the agreements
were assembled for coding: The agreements varied in length from five (the
agreement between the government of Nicaragua and YATAMA) to 52 pages (the
agreement between the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front).
Although longer texts provide more opportunities for statements related to justice,
the emphasis of this project on significance of the principles reduces the problem:
We are interested more in the centrality of each principle than in the number of
times it is mentioned. Each of the four principles of distributive justice was coded
Table 2. Peace agreements data set
Case Difficulty(a) Willingness(b) Justice(c) Implement(d) FL/BL(e)
Zimbabwe 4 1.0 3.75 3 5
Sri Lanka 6 1.7 3.0 1 3
Namibia 0 1.7 4.25 3 4
Nicaragua 1 1.5 3.5 3 4
Lebanon 5 2.7 3.0 2 4
Liberia 6 2.1 1.25 2 3
Angola I 4 .4 2.75 1 4
Cambodia 5 2.2 1.5 2 3
Mozambique 3 1.2 4.5 3 5
El Salvador 1 1.5 2.5 3 5
Somalia 5 1.4 3.5 1 2
Rwanda 3 .4 4.0 1 2
Angola II 4 .9 0 1 3
Bosnia 6 2.2 3.5 2 3
Guatemala 0 1.5 3.25 3 4
Sierra Leone 6 .7 2.0 1 3
Note: The cases are listed in a rough chronological order from the Zimbabwe agreement of 1980 to the
Sierra Leone agreement in 1996.
(a) scale range from 0–8; high score, more difficult conflict environment (Downs/Stedman)
(b) scale range from 0–3; high score, more willingness (Downs/Stedman)
(c) scale range 0–8; high score, principles are more central to the agreement (Druckman/Albin)
(d) scale range 1–3; high score, more successful or durable (Downs/Stedman)
(e) scale range 1–5, high score, more future-oriented terms (Druckman/Albin)
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on the two-step significance or centrality scale described above: Highly significant
(2), important (1.5), marginal (1), the principle is not mentioned (0). A more
finely-tuned scale was created to capture mixed judgments: between important and
highly significant (1.75) and between marginal and important (1.25). Aggregating
the scores across the four principles resulted in a scale ranging from 0 (no
principles in the agreements) to 8 (all principles are highly significant). The index
scores are shown in Table 2. They range from a low of 0 (Angola II) to a high of
4.5 (Mozambique) with an average score of 2.9. For many of these cases principles
of distributive justice are less central than issues of peace.
Anomalies
A review of the complete set of Downs-Stedman implementation codes revealed
only two anomalies. A poorly implemented agreement in Rwanda occurred in a
moderately difficult environment where several justice principles were central to the
agreement. Paris’ account of the Arusha Accords makes evident that this was
a coerced agreement.53 An embattled president viewed this decision as the least
costly alternative in the short run. The principles of justice reflected in the
agreement were meaningless in deed. The false justice implied by this situation led
us to drop the Rwanda case from the statistical analysis.54 This decision may have
implications for the correlation results: The correlation between DJ and durability
would be deflated (by including Rwanda) or inflated (by dropping Rwanda).
The background considerations discussed above led to the decision to drop the
case.
Few principles of justice were central to the El Salvador Chapultepec
agreement. Downs and Stedman coded this agreement as successfully implemented
in a low-difficulty environment. A closer look at the post-agreement conditions
reveals that the economic and social reforms stipulated in the agreement were not
implemented.55 The conditions actually deteriorated with increasing crime and
poverty following the agreement. Thus, the conditions that fuelled the conflict
remained. This situation led us to change the implementation code from success (3)
to partial success (2). Documentation on implementation in the other cases was
judged to be consistent with the codes assigned by Downs and Stedman.
Analyses
The set of justice-durability hypotheses was evaluated with both statistical and
qualitative analyses. Each approach is discussed in this section.
53 Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict.
54 Somalia is another case where many justice principles are included in an agreement that did not
endure. This may however be accounted for by a very difficult conflict environment. Further, the
documentation on the implementation period in Somalia is less detailed than for Rwanda. For these
reasons, the Somalia coding remains in tact.
55 Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict.
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Statistical analyses
A favourable ratio of cases (15) to variables (4) assures sufficient degrees of
freedom to perform statistical tests. The data shown in Table 2 are suited for
correlational analyses. Correlations among the variables were computed resulting
in 4  4 correlation matrices, with a total of 6 pair-wise coefficients in each matrix.
These bivariate correlations are, however, inflated or attenuated due to multi-
collinearity, which means that all the variables in a set are correlated with each
other. The pattern of correlations was diagnosed with a factor analysis. The factor
solution reveals both common (highly correlated variables) and distinct (weakly
correlated variables) factors. But we also performed partial correlations. The
partials remove the variation contributed by a third variable (for example, conflict
difficulty) to the relationship between two other variables (for example, justice and
outcomes). This type of statistical control provides confidence in the calculated
bivariate correlation; it reduces the chances that the correlation is misleading and
contributes to the development of a path model. In addition, regressions were
computed to provide path coefficients used for evaluating mediating effects.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 suggest that justice principles mediate the relationship between
the conflict environment (difficulty) and durability. Indirect effects of justice
variables are assessed by Sobel’s test. The calculations use coefficients and standard
errors from two regressions: A regression with difficulty (independent variable)
predicting the justice (the mediator) and another with difficulty (independent
variable) and justice (mediator) predicting durability (dependent variable). The test
statistic (Sobel’s z) and associated probability levels show the impact of the
mediating variable (justice) on the direct relationship between difficulty and
durability. The power of the test reduces with smaller samples; thus, larger impacts
are needed for statistical significance with samples of 15 than 50.56
In order to evaluate hypotheses 5–9, we performed a disaggregated analysis.
Each of the four principles was correlated separately with the other variables. The
results indicate which principle(s) was primarily responsible for the direct and
indirect relationships between the aggregated justice index and the other variables
in the data set, and, thus, provide evidence for the hypotheses.
Focused comparisons
A qualitative approach, referred to as focused comparisons, was used to further
evaluate hypotheses 3 and 4 about interactions between DJ and the difficulty of the
conflict environment. Based on the logic that supports laboratory experiments, the
method relies on the selection of a small number of similar cases rather than
sampling of a large number of different cases. Cases are chosen because they are
56 For discussions of the strengths and weaknesses of Sobel and related statistical tests for mediation
effects, see R. M. Baron and D. A. Kenny, ‘The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in
Social-Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations’, Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 51 (1986), pp. 1173–82; and D. P. MacKinnon, C. M. Lockwood,
J. M. Hoffman, S. G. West and V. Sheets, ‘Estimating Mediated Effects in Prevention Studies’,
Evaluation Review, 23 (2002), pp. 418–44. For calculation procedures with SPSS and SAS, see K. J.
Preacher and A. F. Hayes, ‘SPSS and SAS Procedures for Estimating IndirectEffects in Simple
Mediation Models’, Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36 (2004), pp. 717–31.
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similar in most respects. They differ on only one or a few independent variables.
For example, both cases are difficult but vary in terms of the number of justice
principles in the agreement; or, both cases are easy but vary in the number of
principles. These comparisons were performed with selected cases from the peace
agreements data set. However, the limited number of cases – and availability of
documented agreements – challenges the ceteris paribus assumption of ‘all other
things being equal’. Within these practical limitations, an attempt was made to
match the comparison cases as closely as possible: For example, cases from the
same region and characteristics of the conflict. These analyses complement the
statistical analyses. They bolster the causal argument suggested by the mediator
analyses while forfeiting the generality or robustness contribution.57
Four cases were chosen from the data set for the focused comparison. The idea
is to compare cases matched on difficulty or conflict intensity but varying in terms
of justice. Two low-difficulty cases from the same region (Central America) are
Guatemala and El Salvador. The former is an example of a high-justice agreement;
relatively few principles judged as significant surface in the latter agreement. Two
high-difficulty cases are Cambodia and Bosnia. Although these cases differ in
several ways, they are both considered to be partial successes and had similar
histories of international intervention. The Cambodia agreement contains few
principles of justice judged to be significant; Bosnia has relatively many principles
judged as being significant. The analysis addresses hypotheses 3 and 4 and answers
the question: Does justice influence implementation when the difficulty of the
conflict environment is controlled at similar levels?
An evaluation of this question was performed with students in a class on
diplomatic negotiation held at the Australian National University. A dozen students
were divided into four groups of three. Each group was assigned a case and
instructed on how to use the forms described earlier for making judgments of justice
and durability. The justice scale ranges from a high of 1.5 (the principle is highly
significant) to a low of .5 (the principle is marginal).58 A score of 0 is assigned when
the principle does not surface in either an explicit or implicit way in the text. The
durability scale ranges from perfect (1) to very poor or non-existent (5) durability.
Each group had the complete text of the agreement and was given reading
material on the five-year implementation period. They were allowed three days to
complete the assignment. The results were recorded and presented at a retreat
de-briefing. We turn now to the findings from both sets of analyses.
Results
This section is divided into four parts. First, we present the correlational findings
based on the 15-case data set followed by a path model that summarises the
57 For more on the relative strengths and weaknesses of these methods, see Alexander L. George and
Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge MA.: MIT
Press, 2005); and Daniel Druckman, Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis
(Thousand Oaks CA.: Sage, 2005), ch. 7.
58 Note that this scale differs from the one used in the quantitative analyses. It contains only four
categories: highly significant, important, marginal, none. The change was made to account for
differences in the familiarity of the respective coders with the cases and concepts. The distinctions
were less fine for the students who participated in the small-n focused-comparison study than for the
more experienced coders of the complete set of agreements.
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findings. Second, we show results from analyses of the separate DJ principles,
including the results of the mediation tests. Third, the forward-backward looking
results are described. And, fourth, the focused comparison results are presented.
Correlation findings: difficulty, DJ, and implementation
The correlation analyses were performed in a sequence where later steps build on
previous results. First, correlations were computed among four variables –
difficulty, willingness, DJ, and implementation/durability – across the 15 cases.
Partial correlations between pairs of variables were also calculated. Then the
correlation matrix was factor analysed. Implications for the justice-durability
relationship are summarised, paving the way for the analyses to follow.
The correlation matrix is shown in Table 3.59 Key results are as follows:
The strongest correlation is between difficulty and implementation (.65). This
correlation is increased somewhat when difficulty is controlled (.71, p < .004).
A slightly reduced correlation between difficulty and implementation occurs
when justice is controlled. The .65 correlation drops to .57 (significant at the
.03 level).
The correlation between justice and implementation is .56 (significant at the .03
level).60 The correlation is about the same when willingness is controlled (.57).
The correlation between justice and difficulty is .37.
A correlation of .46 (p < .10) occurs between justice and implementation when
difficulty of the conflict environment is controlled. The correlation is the same
when both difficulty and willingness are controlled.
The factor analysis of these correlations, shown in Table 4, results in a clear
separation of the variables. A two-factor solution indicates that the first component
59 Correlations were also computed with the 16 cases, including Rwanda and the original implemen-
tation code for El Salvador. Similar results were obtained. However, as noted earlier, the correlation
between DJ and implementation was lower, both when controlling and not controlling for difficulty
of the conflict environment.
60 The correlation between number of justice principles and the measure of centrality of the principles
is strong (.59). Number of principles also correlates significantly with implementation (r = .65).
However, when the centrality variable is removed by partial correlation, the relationship between
number of principles and durability drops to borderline significance (.48). Although not interchange-
able with the centrality variable, number of principles is part of a cluster of correlated variables that
includes centrality, implementation, and difficulty. The former three variables load positively while
the fourth variable (difficulty) loads negatively on the same factor. This factor accounts for
two-thirds of the explained variation in the analysis.
Table 3. Correlations among the variables
Willingness Justice Implementation
Difficulty .142 .367 .647**
Willingness .051 .245
Justice .561*
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level
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(accounting for 52 per cent of the explained variance) consists of the difficulty-
justice-implementation cluster; only willingness loads on to the second factor,
which accounts for 27 per cent of the explained variance.
These results indicate that justice matters. Principles of justice contribute to the
success of implementing peace agreements. However, difficulty remains the primary
influence on implementation. The results show a strong correlation between justice
and implementation (durability). But, the partial correlation between justice and
implementation, controlling for difficulty, is reduced: from .56 to .46. This result
provides modest support for hypothesis 1 but not hypothesis 2: The inclusion of
justice principles in an agreement leads to more durable agreements.
This pattern of correlations is depicted in the form of the model presented in
Figure 2. The implied causal path is based on the assumption that the negotiated
outcome occurs in the context of a (prior) conflict environment and precedes
implementation. Justice principles are shown to moderate the relationship between
difficulty and outcomes.61 When justice principles are central to an agreement, the
negative effects of difficulty are reduced. Similarly, when the principles are not
central to an agreement, the negative impact of difficulty is heightened. This finding
does not support hypothesis 3. However, in support of hypothesis 4, it may be
suggested that when justice principles are central, the durability of implementation
is increased in less difficult conflict environments. Thus, justice principles had a
modest influence on durability in both more and less-difficult conflict environ-
ments. Results of the Sobel’s z tests were not significant. These conclusions are
explored further in the analyses reported in the following sections.
Separate DJ principles
Coding decisions for each DJ principle by case are shown in Table 5 along with the
outcome (durability) code. Equality was the predominant principle in most of the
agreements (M = 1.27) followed by compensation (M = .75), need (M = .73), and
proportionality (M = .29). A Friedman ANOVA for related samples showed that
significantly more equality principles were represented in the agreements than the other
three principles (F(r) = 17.88, 3 df, p < .0001). Pair comparisons were made with the
61 Similar results were obtained from a regression analysis. A significant main effect was obtained for
difficulty, a borderline effect for justice (p < .10) and a borderline interaction between difficulty and
justice. The interaction bolsters our interpretation of a modest moderating effect of justice on the
relationship between difficulty and outcomes.
Table 4. Factor analysis results
Variable Factor I Loadings Factor II Loadings
Difficulty .797* .361
Willingness .139 .969*
Justice .761* .019
Implementation .914* .151
* Substantial loading on the factor
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Wilcoxon signed ranks test for related samples. Equality principles were more central
to the agreements than proportionality (z = 3.33, p < .001), compensation (z = 2.07,
p < .038), and need (z = 1.89, p < .058).62 These findings provide strong evidence for
62 The related samples tests are based on the assumption that the four principles are multiple
(correlated) measures of the same construct. An independent samples test is based on the assumption
that the measures are uncorrelated. None of the six correlations among the four types of principles
approach significance; they range from .03 to .40. A one-way ANOVA for independent samples was
also calculated showing similar results: F = 7, 3 df, p < .0001. Tukey post hoc multiple comparisons
showed that equality was more central to the agreements than proportionality (p < .0001),
compensation (p < .081), and need (p < .066).
.56
Figure 2. A Statistical Path Model.
Table 5. Cases by principles and durability
Case Equality* Proportionality Compensation Need Implementation**
Angola I 0 0 0 0 1
Angola II 1.33 0 0 0 1
Bosnia 1.67 1.33 0 0 2
Cambodia 1.33 0 0 2 2
El Salvador 1.33 0 1 1 2
Guatemala 2 0 1 1 3
Lebanon 1.67 1.33 0 .67 2
Liberia .67 0 0 .67 2
Mozambique 2 .67 1 .67 3
Namibia 2 0 1.33 0 3
Nicaragua 1.33 0 1.33 1.67 3
Rwanda 1 .67 1.33 .67 1
Sierra Leone 0 0 1.67 1.67 1
Somalia 1 0 1 1 1
Sri Lanka 1 0 1.33 0 1
Zimbabwe 2 .67 1 .67 3
* Each principle was judged on a two-step scale.
** The implementation scores are the outcome scores from Downs and Stedman (2002), with an
adjustment for El Salvador from 3 to 2.
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hypothesis 5 but not hypothesis 7. Equality – rather than proportionality, compensa-
tion, or need – was the key principle in most of the agreements, including those
primarily about sources and those that addressed symptoms.
The centrality of equality principles was strongly correlated with durability
across the 15 cases (r = .76, p < .001) and when Rwanda is included in the data
set (r = .76, p < .001). The correlation remains strong when each of the other three
principles is controlled (proportionality: .77; compensation: .75; need: .79). None of
the other three principles correlates with durability (proportionality: .10; compen-
sation: .16; need: .10). Thus, in support of hypothesis 6, equality accounts for the
relationship reported above between distributive justice and durability. Equality is
also shown to moderate the relationship between difficulty of the conflict
environment and durability. The correlation between difficulty and durability
decreases when equality is controlled, from .66 to .52. Similarly, the
correlation between equality and durability decreases when difficulty is controlled,
from .73 to .63. These findings are consistent with the path model shown in Figure
2. They are bolstered by the results of the Sobel’s test for mediating effects. A
borderline significant z (1.71, p < .09) suggests that equality mediates the
relationship between difficulty and durability.63 The mediation model is shown in
Figure 3. The causal direction shown in the figure goes from difficulty to durability
through equality. The path does not travel in the opposite direction: difficulty of
the conflict was not shown to mediate the relationship between equality and
durability (z = 1.40, p < .16).
The results also provide strong support for hypothesis 6 but not for hypothesis
8: equality, but not proportionality, led to more durable agreements. Nor do the
findings support hypothesis 9: the centrality of compensation and need principles
did not correlate with durability. These principles were infrequently mentioned in
the agreements.
63 The borderline finding is impressive given the challenge of attaining a significant z with a small
number of cases.
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Figure 3. Mediating effect of equality.
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Forward and backward-looking (FL/BL) outcomes
The correlation findings with the FL/BL variable are as follows:
FL/BL correlates significantly with durability (.66, p < .008) and equality (.61,
p < .02).
The FL/BL correlation with durability decreases from .66 to .38 (p > .10) when
controlling for equality.
The relationship between FL/BL is mediated by equality. A Sobel’s z of 1.96
is significant below the .05 level. The relationship between equality and durability
is not mediated by FL/BL. The relationship between equality and durability
remains the same when FL/BL controlled (r = .61 with and without controls).
A significant negative correlation between FL/BL and difficulty (.58, p < .02)
drops to .41 when equality is controlled.
FL/BL does not correlate significantly with proportionality (.22), compensation
(.20), or need (.01).
Thus, FL/BL influences durability through equality principles. Although FL/BL
correlates with equality, it does not influence durability independent of this DJ
principle. These results provide partial support for hypothesis 10. Durability
depends to a large extent on the forward-looking principle of equality. It is not
influenced by the other DJ principles – proportionality, compensation, need –
which may not be indicators of the FL/BL construct.
Focused comparisons
In this section we report the results of the each group’s judgments and the
pair-comparison findings.
Guatemala: 4.5 (Justice), 4 (some elements of durability)
The high justice score reflects compensatory and needs principles (backward-
looking) addressed primarily by the rebel group (URNG), not the government. The
weak durability contradicts the judgment of success shown in Table 1 above.
According to Paris,64 the underlying sources of the conflict were not addressed and,
in fact, the economic recovery only served to increase the tensions in the society.
This is similar to the post-agreement situation in El Salvador. (The justice coder
provided detailed information on the rationale and location of statements on which
the codes are based.)
El Salvador: 2.75 (Justice), 3 (good on durability)
These scores corroborate our coding of few justice principles judged as being
significant. The students’ coding of durability is consistent with our discussion
64 Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (source used by the coders).
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above about anomalous cases. Justice principles were not significant and the
sources of conflict (poverty) were not addressed. Thus, our decision to alter the
outcome score for the correlation analysis is supported.
Bosnia: 4 (Justice), 3 (good on durability)
These codes corroborate our judgment on the justice principles as well as on
durability (partial success). A more forward-looking justice is reflected in the
predominance of equality and proportionality principles. Perhaps this is what the
US mediation at Dayton had in mind, but used coercive tactics to bring it about.
Cambodia: 2.75 (Justice), 4 (some elements of durability)
The students coded more justice principles – especially equality and proportionality
– than we did. The judgment of partial success shown in Table 1 above is perhaps
a bit more optimistic than the students’ reading of the implementation period.
The results of the pair-comparison control for difficulty are as follows:
Bosnia vs. Cambodia: High difficulty with many (Bosnia) or few (Cambodia)
principles.
Bosnia was good on durability, Cambodia was coded as having some elements.
This provides support for the relevance of justice principles. The centrality of
justice principles attenuates the effects of difficult environments.
Guatemala vs. El Salvador: Low difficulty with many (Guatemala) or few (El
Salvador) principles judged as significant.
El Salvador was coded as somewhat stronger on durability than Guatemala.
This result does not support the importance of justice principles. However, on
closer inspection, the opposite result is apparent. Our appraisal of El Salvador
above suggests poor durability. The compensatory and needs principles found in
the Guatemala agreement were based on the initiative of the rebel group and did
not address the underlying sources of the conflict. This interpretation lends support
to hypothesis 1 (but not hypothesis 2) on the justice-durability relationship: Few
principles judged as significant and poor durability for El Salvador; superficial
(backward-looking) justice and poor durability for Guatemala.
These results bolster the argument that justice principles matter. They make a
difference in both high and low-difficult conflict environments. They corroborate
the statistical findings: Hypothesis 3 on more intense conflicts (high difficulty
environments) is not supported; hypothesis 4 on less intense conflicts (low difficulty
environments) is supported. And, according to the correlational patterns and
regression results, the two variables interact; they act together in influencing the
durability of peace agreements. The interaction is depicted in the form of a 2 
2 matrix shown in Figure 4.
Discussion
The study’s results are discussed in three parts: the relationship between the
aggregate measure of justice and durability, the role of the equality principle, and
suggestions for further research.
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Justice and durability
The analyses reported in this article show that the durability of peace agreements
depends, at least in part, on principles of distributive justice. This relationship was
shown to be contingent on factors in the environment that exacerbate or attenuate
the intensity of conflict. These factors are referred to as difficulty. By including
difficulty variables in the analyses we provide a more complex rendering of the
hypothesis that justice influences the durability of agreements. It is not surprising
that agreements are more difficult to implement in environments where the
incentives for continued fighting outweigh those for making peace. Examples of
these conflict environments were Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Liberia, Cambodia, Somalia,
Bosnia, and Sierra Leone. It is interesting to note that, despite the difficulty, four
of these agreements were a partial success. For two of these partial successes –
Lebanon and Bosnia – justice principles were in play (see Table 2). And, the case
of Zimbabwe illustrates success in a moderately difficult environment where all four
principles played a role in the agreement (see Table 5). For three failed cases –
Angola I, Angola II, Sierra Leone – few justice principles came into play. Thus,
justice can offset the negative effects of the conflict environment; it can also
reinforce the positive effects of an environment that is more conducive to peace.
These findings suggest a modification in the contending hypotheses (1 versus 2).
Justice principles contribute to the stabilisation of relationships in both more and
less difficult environments. It is not the case that the principles further destabilise
relationships in more difficult environments as suggested by the third hypothesis.
The focused comparison results strengthen the argument that justice plays an
important role in peace agreements. By selecting cases in each quadrant of a
justice-difficulty matrix – all combinations of high and low on both variables – we
were able to evaluate the relationship between justice and durability. In effect, we
have examined each variable independently. This advantage of the matched-case
procedure complements the strengths of statistical analysis of a large number of
different cases. The students’ judgments for the high-difficulty cases does not
support hypothesis 3. Their decisions on the low-difficulty cases do not support
hypothesis 4: both these cases were poor on durability. However, upon closer
inspection, the opposite interpretation is apparent: The justice principles in the
Guatemala agreement were backward-looking. This interpretation then does lend
support for hypothesis 4. These findings also illustrate the value of complementary
research approaches. The quantitative analyses provide evidence for a general
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Figure 4. A 2  2 matrix of impacts on durability.
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relationship between justice and durability. The qualitative work provides a deeper
appreciation for the role played by justice during implementation. Results obtained
from these complementary analyses converge on the discovery of modest mediating
effects of justice on the relationship between difficulty and durability, in the form
of a statistical path model (Figure 2) and a 2  2 classification matrix (Figure 3).
Both analyses illuminate the value of control, first by using partial correlations and
then by selecting cases on the independent variables.
The role of justice in implementation is further strengthened when the willing-
ness (interest and commitment) variable is taken into account. The factor analyses
show that this variable is independent of justice, difficulty, and durability. The
correlation analyses indicate stronger relationships between justice and durability
than between willingness and durability Further, the justice-durability and justice-
difficulty correlations change little when willingness is controlled. An interpretation
of these findings is that durability depends more on justice principles – especially if
they are adhered to during implementation – than on support from regional states.
This may be due, at least in part, to the strength of these actors’ commitments.
Their interest may wane through the long period of implementation in both more
and less difficult conflict environments. It may also be due to the offsetting effects of
intervention, namely, interveners both fuel and reduce the conflict. As advocates for
one or another party, they interfere with implementation. Their role may be more
useful when they serve as third parties in the negotiation process, as illustrated by
Mozambique, Bosnia, Sri Lanka and other cases in the data set.
The principle of equality
The correlation between distributive justice and durability was largely accounted
for by the equality principle. It was the only one of the four DJ principles that
correlated strongly with durability, and the correlation remained strong when other
factors were controlled. Additional analyses showed that equality mediated the
relationship between difficulty and durability. The causal link between the conflict
environment and durability travelled through the centrality of equality principles in
the agreements (Figure 3): equality principles moderated (enhanced) the impact of
relatively negative (positive) conflict environments. Thus, hypotheses 5 and 6 are
supported. Hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 are not supported: proportionality, compensa-
tion, and need do not distinguish among the cases; this occurs for both the cases
that address sources and those that focus more on symptoms; equality was the
predominant principle across the cases. And, it is a forward-looking principle as
indicated by a strong correlation with an independent measure of FL/BL outcomes.
Backward-looking outcomes were rarely accompanied by equality principles.
However, it was the equality principles rather than the FL/BL outcomes that
influenced durability: equality mediated the relationship between FL/BL and
durability. Thus, the principle of equality accounts for the relationships of context
(conflict environment) and type of outcome (FL/BL) with durability.
These findings corroborate the laboratory results obtained by Deutsch.65 He
explained his results in terms of the importance of interdependence and an
65 Deutsch, Distributive Justice: A Social-Psychological Perspective.
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aspiration for cooperation or solidarity. But, there may be other reasons for the
prevalence of equality. This was explored with the student coders participating in
the focused comparison exercise.
The students were asked to indicate which of several possible explanations
might explain the emphasis on the equality principle in their case. Equality in the
Guatemala negotiation was explained in terms of structural equality implied by a
willingness to negotiate. Equality in the Bosnia case was explained in terms of a
mutual desire to reinforce aspirations for implementing a new relationship. Both
explanations were cited for Mozambique but the outcome was understood in
relation to actions taken by the mediating team during the negotiating process. The
mediators in that case emphasised equality in both structural and relational terms.
Thus, there seems to be alternative explanations for the prevalence of equality in
these agreements. But, the explanation may be less important than the presence of
equal terms in the agreement. Each reason – structures, relations, uncertainty – may
serve as a motivating factor for assuring that the parties leave the table with an
understanding that they will move forward as equal partners. Such understanding
contributes to the durability of the agreement. It must however be sustained through
time. This may depend on the extent to which equality enhances trust, particularly
the form of trust based on shared identities.66 Indeed, trust is central to Uslaner’s
model linking inequality to corruption and instability.67 It may also mediate the
relationship between equality and durability. This remains to be explored.
Equality may serve different purposes for the parties to these peace agreements.
Power-sharing would seem to be a strong motive for many of the rebellious groups
in our cases.68 It contributes to political stability.69 Stability looms large as an
aspiration for the governments. However, these desires may not be realised in the
period following the agreement. Many of the agreements provided representation
for the former combatants in majoritarian political systems: As minority voices,
these groups have limited power over legislation or policies. The hoped-for stability
may whither as former rebels realise that they are on the short side of privileges.
In his interpretation of Tocqueville’s writing, Elster observes that ‘a given
difference appears as more intolerable the more equal conditions are in society as
a whole.’70 The flames of instability are fuelled by equality: the former rebels
become less tolerable of small differences between the groups. These interesting
ideas remain to be evaluated.
Further research
The framework and analyses reported in this article are first steps in a larger
programme of research. A number of next steps are contemplated. One step is to
expand the data set to include other peace agreements, for example those that have
66 Lewicki, Litterer, Minton and Sanders, Negotiation (2nd Edition).
67 Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law.
68 See also Jarstad and Sundberg, ‘Peace by pact’.
69 Hartzell and Hoddie, Crafting Peace.
70 Jon Elster, ‘The psychology of democracy in America’, in The Great Ideas Today (Chicago:
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1994), p. 108.
Distributive justice and peace agreements 1165
occurred since the end of World War Two. The large number of cases would
bolster the argument for generality. Another step consists of evaluating hypotheses
suggested by the anomalous cases. These hypotheses focus on the implementation
period, highlighting differences within each of the parties and adherence of both
parties to justice principles. The cases also raise the interesting distinction between
justice embodied in an agreement and evident during the implementation period.
Durability turns on both: failure to adhere to the principles threatens durability;
new principles that emerge during implementation may either threaten or
strengthen the terms of the agreement. These are new variables to be added to the
data set. Each can be coded from case studies that describe the post-settlement
period in some detail.71
A second step consists of examining the agreement texts for other kinds of
justice principles: structure, process, and procedures. Such an examination requires
developing hypotheses, constructing coding rules, accumulating material on the
process, and performing analyses. Examples of two hypotheses are:
+ Structural and process justice are correlated: The more equal the represen-
tation of the parties (structure), the less they rely on coercive or deceptive
tactics (process).
+ Outcome justice co-varies with process and procedural justice: More
principles of distributive justice are found in agreements that emanate from
fair processes.
Exceptions to the second hypothesis may occur. In some cases the principles that
surface in the text may not emerge from a fair process. They may be included for the
sorts of political reasons evident in the Arusha Accords. Or, they may be the result of
a coercive process engineered by a more powerful party. These examples of false justice
decrease the chances of sustaining the terms of the agreement through time. Thus, a
third hypothesis can be suggested for further exploration: justice outcomes that emerge
from fair processes or procedures are more likely to be sustained; those that emerge
from unfair processes or procedures are less likely to be sustained.
A challenge to process analysis is the general lack of appropriate documenta-
tion. Few cases are catalogued in the way that Hume72 describes the round-by-
round discussions on Mozambique or Raszelenberg’s73 analytical chronology
developed for the Cambodia peace process. However, process documentation does
exist for a number of the other cases, albeit varying in detail. This documentation
can be a basis for statistical analyses. An alternative research strategy is to perform
analyses on a small number of well-documented cases, sufficient for performing
focused comparisons. They would also permit process tracing analyses to explore
the above hypotheses about possible causal relationships between process or
procedural and outcome justice as well as plausibility probes for discovering
mechanisms that explain those relationships.74
71 Sources include the cases discussed by the contributed chapters in Stedman et al., Ending Civil Wars,
and in Paris, At War’s End.
72 Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique’s War (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1995).
73 P. Raszelenberg, The Cambodia Conflict: Search for a Settlement, 1979–1991: An Analytical
Chronology (Hamburg, Germany: Institute of Asian Affairs, 1995).
74 See Druckman, Doing Research, ch. 6 for the procedures; see Cynthia Irmer and Daniel Druckman,
‘Explaining negotiation outcomes: Process or context?’, Negotiation and Conflict Management
Research, 2 (2009), pp. 209–235 for an application to peace negotiations.
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Process documentation provides a data set for evaluating hypotheses about
relationships between procedural justice (PJ), outcomes (DJ, FL/BL), and dur-
ability. Four types of PJ can be coded: transparency, fair representation, fair
treatment/fair play, and voluntary agreement. The PJ-outcome relationship has
been examined, most recently in the study by Hollander-Blumoff and Tyler.75 The
proposed study extends the focus to issues of durability. But, there are other
process variables that merit further investigation. These include perceptions of
various types of justice, trust, false vs. genuine justice, strategic decision making,
and other variables emphasised in the psychological literature on justice.76 A
challenge is to develop appropriate indicators of these subjective variables.
Third, the justice-durability framework developed for this project applies as
well to agreements negotiated in other domains. One of these domains is the
environment, as illustrated earlier with the case of the Montreal Protocol. The
relevance of the framework is illustrated also by the Oslo Protocol on Acid Rain.
Using our codes, that particular case showed a strong relationship between justice
principles (4.33 on the eight-step scale, with higher scores indicating more centrality
for the principles) and durability (highly durable – 2 on the five-step scale with
higher scores indicating less durability). By adding other environmental cases, we
can build a data set comparable to the one assembled for peace agreements.
Similar efforts can be made to assemble a data set on trade cases. The Cameron
and Tomlin book on NAFTA provides an example of the sort of documentation
available in this domain.77 With data sets in hand, a three-way comparison of
domains (peace, environment, trade) would reveal the generality (or context-
specificity) of the justice-durability hypothesis. The experience of working across
issue domains would also inform us about the generality of the concept definitions
and codes used for these analyses of peace agreements: for example, the difference
between terms of exchange – as specific reciprocity – in trade talks, compensation
– as a more diffuse reciprocity78 – in environmental negotiations, and the less
tangible criteria that address relational issues in talks to end civil wars.
Fourth, connections between peace agreements and peace-building activities can
be explored. The question of whether forward-looking agreements enhance the
prospects for societal transformation remains to be evaluated. This project and
others have developed indicators at the micro level for types of peace agreements
and the role of justice principles in those agreements. Less has been done
along these lines at the macro level of societal change or transformation. The
Downs-Stedman index of difficulty provides information relevant to the prospects
for change. The index does not, however, capture evolving institutional pro-
cesses during transitions to democratic systems. The development of macro-level
75 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff and Tom R. Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural
Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential’, Law & Social Inquiry, 33 (2008),
pp. 473–500.
76 For example, Mikula and Wenzel, ‘Justice and Social Conflicts’.
77 Maxwell A. Cameron and Brian W. Tomlin, The Making of NAFTA: How the Deal was Done
(Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 2000). See also the ten trade cases analysed in Druckman for
turning points in the negotiation process. (Daniel Druckman, ‘Turning Points in International
Negotiation: A Comparative Analysis’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45 (2001), pp. 519–44). These
cases can also be used to evaluate the justice-durability hypothesis.
78 See Robert Keohane, ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’, International Organization, 40 (1986),
pp. 1–28.
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indicators would facilitate performing analyses that connect micro with macro-level
processes. They would also provide insight into the sorts of institutional reforms
needed for large-scale transformations to occur. These analyses address some larger
consequences of justice principles. They are part of an expanded agenda for
research on justice and the durability of negotiated agreements.
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